A Blueprint for Short-Term Petroleum Supply Crises Management by LaPointe, Thomas F.
Thomas LaPointe
A Blueprint
for Short-
Term Petroleum
Supply Crises
Management
For most North Carolinians, and for that matter,
most Americans, thoughts of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) oil embargo
during the winter and spring of 1973 do not provide
pleasant memories. It was a time of personal
hardship, dramatically changing daily routines, con-
siderable inconvenience, and a deepened national
recession. However, the embargo's end saw most of
the population return to normal routines, changed
somewhat to accomodate higher petroleum prices,
but unhampered by fuel shortages. A sluggish
economy began the long slow road to recovery. But
suspicion still lingers that the problem of future
petroleum embargoes, and subsequent economic
and daily chaos, remained unaddressed. Would the
national and state governments be able to respond
quickly and boldly should another sudden supply in-
terruption occur in the near future? Are we better
prepared for this contingency in the near future, and if
we are , at what levels of preparedness are we?
This paper is written to dispel some of the ap-
prehension which now surrounds any discussion of
petroleum embargoes. Its focus is short term supply
crisis management caused by an embargo or natural
catastrophe such as a break in the Alaskan pipeline. It
describes the legislated national goals which will be
operating during the next supply denial and briefly
details the national programs which have been
developed around them. It closes with a summary of
actions which have been taken in North Carolina, and
some comments on the basic orientation of the
management framework and its implications to state
and local policy making.
At the outset it is necessary to distinguish between
long term and short term energy policies. Planning for
the long term allows much greater flexibility in the
choice of policy direction and implementation tools
Large capital expenditures can be made over extend-
ed periods. "Project Independence'' is a long term
effort. In the short term we are restricted to the capital
stock at hand; we must focus attention on the societal
preferences which define energy demand patterns,
and institute programs which can be activated quickly
without burdensome administrative machinery.
Clearly the only way to protect ourselves complete-
ly against future international petroleum embargoes
is to attain total self-sufficiency in petroleum by a
combination of increased domestic production,
petroleum conservation and fuel substitution in the
long run. This is the goal of the "Project In-
dependence" program. It is evident from President
Carter's campaign statements that the new ad-
ministration will increase the importance of certain
elements of "Project Independence" at the expense
of others. We may expect greater emphasis on solar
energy, conservation, and coal and lesser emphasis
on nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, conservative es-
timates now place the time of complete petroleum
self sufficiency 1 5 to 20 years in the future. Clearly a
program is required to ease possible short term crises
like embargoes during this interim period.
The current national program for accomplishing
this is a direct outgrowth of the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act (93-159) and the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (94-1 63) drafted by predominantly
Democratic Congresses in 1973 and 1975. Its basic
orientation is price control, governmental allocation
of fuels, and emergency release of petroleum
stockpiles. This emphasis on a governmentally con-
trolled market is indicative of the party which con-
trolled Congress during this period. With the
Democratic party now in power in both the legislative
and executive branches, a shift toward a freer market
approach is highly unlikely. For these reasons and the
fact that national policy makers will now most
assuredly focus their attention on the longer term
self-sufficiency solutions, we can expect little change
in this short term crisis management blueprint. While
there may be some slight modifications.the basic for-
mat will in all likelihood remain.
U. S. Vulnerability
In October 1 973,the United States was consuming
about 17.6 million barrels (mmb) of petroleum each
day, of which 6.2 mmb (or 35%) were supplied by
crude oil and refined product (residual oil) imports.
The Arab oil embargo, which lasted from October to
February of that year, reduced available petroleum
supplies in the U. S. from 5-15 per cent over the
period. It was most critically felt during the first
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Are we prepared to confront a future petroleum em-
bargo? Photo by Alan Geir, The Daily Tar Heel
quarter of 1 974 when imports were 2.2 mmb below
previously projected volumes.
The impact of the embargo on the nation's economy
was severe. First quarter 1974 Gross National
Product (GNP) figures showed a 7 per cent drop
where a slight increase had been forecast. The pro-
jected slowdown became a deep recession. A subse-
quent economic analysis' estimated the GNP loss at
3-4 percent for the duration of the embargo or 1 5-20
billion dollars in damage to the trillion dollar
economy.
The most severe economic impacts that con-
sumers still feel every day, were a result of the
dramatic increase in the price of crude oil imports, an
increase directly traceable to the events of the winter
of 1973. Those refiners whose businesses and
customers were directly imperiled by the October
supply cut-off entered the world market in panic.
Their bidding for the small amounts of excess produc-
tive capacity which then existed in non-embargoing
nations such as Iran pushed prices to double and tri-
ple the pre-October prices. Petroleum, which was
originally selling at $5.00 per barrel, now brought
$1 5.00. Recognizing this high value, and the degree
of short term demand inelasticity, OPEC nations im-
mediately doubled world price and since then have
artificially managed supply to support higher prices.
Supply Situation is Not Changing
While nationally the impacts of the embargo were
severe, in some regions they bordered on the
catastrophic. States along the east coast, North
Carolina among them, suffered supply shortfalls well
in excess of the 1 per cent national average. Accor-
ding to one report released recently by the Federal
Energy Administration (FEA), 2 February 1974 gas-
oline supplies in North Carolina fell 1 9 percent short
of estimated requirements. At thesametime, in some
oil rich states (notably Texas, Oklahoma, and
Louisiana) supplies were up to 20 percent in excess of
demand. The Eastern region, with little domestic oil
production, received a large percentage of its im-
ported supplies from insecure resources in the Arab
bloc.
Since the embargo high petroleum prices have
forced consumption downward. However, import
volumes have not been correspondingly reduced
because domestic production, due either to naturally
dwindling resources or controlled prices has fallen by
almost the same amount as consumption. In fact,
even though total demand is lower, imports today
comprise a greater percentage of total supplies (40
percent of current supplies are imported, 18 percent
from Arab nations). The future is no brighter. Alaskan
oil and exploration of the outer continental shelf will
increase domestic production; but a reduction in pre-
sent Canadian imports, continued declines in yields
from domestic fields, and a now obvious reversal in
demand patterns will perpetuate our long term
reliance on Saudi and other Mid-eastern oil.
To make matters worse, the current high price of
petroleum has forced out of the economy many low-
valued uses. Price has forced people to conserve.
Thus, a loss of substantial petroleum supplies (of the
order of 1 973) would wreak much greater economic
havoc today than three years ago.
"These post 1 973 trends of increasing
reliance upon imports and deepening
economic vulnerability have es-
tablished the need for a contingency
strategy at the national level."
These post 1 973 trends of increasing reliance upon
imports and deepening economic vulnerability have
established the need for a contingency strategy at the
national level. Planning activities over the last three
years, in both the legislative and executive branches
of government have resulted in a sharply defined
program for facing future crises in petroleum supply.
In order to place the components of this response
strategy in a viable planning framework we first
must consider the national objectives which will be
pursued during a future embargo.
National Objectives
The basic focus of the national response is stated
clearly in two national energy policy bills: the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (PL 93-159)
passed during the 1973 embargo, and the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act (PL 94-1 63) passed two
years later. The four national goals to be pursued in
combatting a supply crisis were clearly enunciated in
the EPAAandunchanged in the later bill. Theyareto:
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(1
)
Meet national priority needs
especially with respect to public
health, safety and welfare, national
defense, agriculture, basic public
services, and energy production.
(2) Achieve an equitable distribu-
tion of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and
refined petroleum products at
equitable prices among all regions
and areas of the United States, assur-
ing full refinery operation to the ex-
tent practicable.
(3) Protect market shares of in-
dependent refiners, small refiners,
and nonbranded independent
marketers.
(4) And maintain economic ef-
ficiency by minimizing economic dis-
tortion, inflexibility and unnecessary
interference with market
mechanisms.
To advance these goals, three major programs
were outlined in the Act: one of price controls,
another to equitably allocate crude oil, and a third to
distribute petroleum products according to a priority
system.
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act main-
tained these programs except for minor refinements
and mandated the formulation of standby coupon
rationing and energy conservation plans. The core
proposal of the EPCA, the creation of a Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR), marked a dramatic shift in
contingency planning; a shift away from conservation
and allocation toward replacement of lost supplies
with additional petroleum sources. This change in
emphasis reflects the perceived increasing economic
vulnerability of the United States to petroleum import
interruptions and the rising cost in inconvenience,
delay, and economic hardship associated with crash
energy conservation programs.
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), as
authorized by Congress, is an 8-10 billion dollar pro-
ject designed to store between 500 million and 1
billion barrels of crude oil and petroleum products.
The massive size of the program would provide six
months to one year of direct supply substitution for a
very severe embargo on the order of 3mmb a day.
The SPR program has been justified by a
cost/benefit analysis which computed the economic
losses averted by the reserve expressed as GNP and
consumer surplus, for specific embargo scenarios
(i.e., duration, magnitude, time of occurrence). These
benefits were then compared against the cost of par-
ticular reserve volumes. 3
Most of the Strategic Reserve will be stored as
crude oil in natural salt dome formations along the
Gulf of Mexico. The National Petroleum Council 4
suggested storing two types of crude oils: one a high
density, high sulfur variety, and the other of low den-
sity and low sulfur content. The first report of the
Reserve Program to Congress is due by December
1 976. Filling should commence shortly thereafter. It
is projected, however, t hat the 500 mmb mark will not
be reached until 1982.
The programs established by the acts, or those
growing out of the stipulated national goals fall into
four broad categories: programs to increase available
supplies, programs to control petroleum prices,
programs to reduce petroleum demand, and
programs to allocate crude oil and petroleum
products.
Table 1 lists the current status of these programs:
whether they are currently operating and significant-
ly affecting petroleum supply and/or demand;
operating but of major importance only during a sup-
ply shortfall; or operational only upon activation by
the President or his representative during a supply
crisis. Figure 1 is a summary schematic showing
the relationship of each program to the various ele-
ments of the petroleum distribution chain.
The burden each program will bear in meeting the
crisis, will to a large extent, depend upon the cir-
cumstances surrounding the interruption; however,
together they represent the extent of the non-military
Category
Increase supplies
Control Prices
Reduce Demand
Allocate Available Supplies
Table 1
Status of Strategic Programs
StatusProgram
International energy program
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Temporary Pumping Rates
Two -tier Price System
National Average Price
(Entitlements Program)
Cost Pass Through
Voluntary Conservation
Mandatory Conservation
Buy-Sell program
Refinery Yield
Mandatory Product Allocation
Coupon Gasoline Rationing
Emergency Standby
Emergency Standby
Emergency Standby
Currently operating witn substantial supply/ demand im-
pact. Phasing out over next 3 years.
Currently operating. Phasing out.
Currently operating. Phasing out.
Emergency Standby
Emergency Standby
Currently operating but of little impact except during
supply crisis.
Emergency Standby
Currently operating but of little impact except during a
supply crisis.
Emergency Standby
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strategic response. Following is a brief description of
each program and a glimpse at what the situation
might look like the next time around.
Increase Available Supplies
The qu ickest way to defeat the embargo would be to
arrange for long term substitution of the petroleum
supplies lost. This minimizes economic damage and
alerts the perpetrators that to be effective the em-
bargo must be very long in duration and very great in
the amount of petroleum denied. Four programs are
directed at increasing available supplies.
International Energy Program. If the interruption is
directed against one or a few nations the Inter-
national Energy Program (IEP) will act to distribute the
remaining total imports among all importing nations.
This will result in a net increase in supplies to the
nations against which the embargo is specifically
targeted. Most oil importing nations, the United
States, the countries of western Europe, and others,
belong to the IEP. The program is activated if any one
member experiences a supply loss of 7% or greater.
Supplies are redistributed up to the point where all
nonembargoed members suffer a loss of 10 percent
of their own supplies. 5 Since the United States is the
most likely victim of a future Arab oil embargo we
should derive considerable benefits from the
program.
increase Imports from Non-embargoing Nations.
The decrease in world demand for petroleum brought
about by the sudden price increase has left many
petroleum exporters with excess capacity. This ex-
cess capacity represents a readily available
"reserve". However, we do not want importing firms
to enter the market in a state of panic, as happened
during the 1 973 crisis, bidding prices up to new ex-
cessively high levels. The government must act to
relieve the price pressure and at the same time offer
incentives for seeking out reasonably priced ad-
ditional imports. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve,
besides reducing economic damage by supplying ad-
ditional oil, is well suited to this task.
Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The reserve will
probably be one of the first programs instituted in a
sudden supply loss. However, the operation of the
reserve will require a number of specific policy
decisions at the time of release. Once reserve use has
been initiated, decisions must be made about the
amount of petroleum to be drawn down, the price to
be charged for the petroleum, and the proportions of
different types of reserve crude which will be sold.
The reserve will most likely be drawn down at a rapid
rate in the initial stages in an attempt to breakthe will
of the embargoers and prevent citizen panic.
Reserves will be depleted at lower rates as the em-
bargo period lengthensand other programs begin to
show results; for example, as mandatory and volun-
tary fuel conservation force demand downward. The
price charged for the released petroleum, if set slight-
ly above pre-embargo prices, would act to encourage
the contracting of additional imports and at the same
time place a ceiling on import prices. All else being
equal a refiner seeing two sources of supply will opt
for the cheaper of the two. In this sense the SPR func-
tions as an additional petroleum exporter in competi-
tion with non-embargoing exporters. In times of a
severe shortfall, the amount of reserve released could
be put up for bids subject to some minumum price.
Thus import prices would be forced to equilibrate with
reserve price. Pricing and drawdown strategies for
the reserve are still in the early stages of formulation
Carolina planning
but optimal strategies are essential if full benefits are
10 be derived from the SPR.
Emergency Pumping Rates. The EPCA gave the
President the authority to order increased pumping
rates from certain domestic natural gas and
petroleum fields. The President may require these
fields to produce at the maximum efficient rate for the
duration, and at a temporary production rate for a
period not to exceed 90 days. The temporary rate
carries the risk of permanent rupture of the oil
reservoir if prolonged, and most domestic fields
currently produce at the maximum efficient rate due
to a price incentive.
Only minima I additional supplies are expected from
these programs, and some price incentives would
have to be offered to assure the increased production.
Control Prices
The price control program has three major
elements. Its foundation is a two-tier price system and
a cost pass-through. Complementing this is a
program to average petroleum prices among
purchasers. The program is designed to prevent inor-
dinate profit-taking, equitably distribute the
differences in the prices of oil from different sources,
and provide economic incentives for developing ad-
ditional sources of supply.
The two tier system currently imposed on all oil
supplies went into effect with the passage of the
EPAA and will gradually be phased out over the next
three years. However it will most likely be reinstated
in a similar form in the event of a future embargo. The
program establishes two base prices for crude oil. The
lower tier is a price set on 1972 volumes of
domestically produced oil. This price is currently
$5.25 per barrel. The higher price, approximately that
of imported oil, applies to imports, small well produc-
tion and volumes above those of 1 972. Together the
two prices act to prevent huge profits on traditional
domestic supplies which would be brought about by
allowing these supplies to equilibratewith artificially
high OPEC prices while providing a price incentive for
increased production.
In order to eliminate the competitive price advan-
tage of those companies with large domestic supplies
controlled at the lower price, a national average price
is calculated and revenues are consequently divided
among suppliers and importer. The cost pass-through
program assures that dramatic increases in price or
supply related costs are passed through to the con-
sumer on a strictly dollar for dollar basis. No ad-
ditional profitting is permitted at any step in the dis-
tribution chain from primary supplier to retail dis-
tributor. Such a program permits the search for more
expensive sources, but ensures that final consumers
will derive full benefits from additional supplies.
Since a price control program will be in effect, it
follows that price will not be used to equilibrate supp-
ly with demand nor will it bear the burden of fuel
allocation as it would if prices were allowed to float.
Thus, if the combination of emergency supply in-
creases and small price rises fail to accommodate the
perceived national demand, additional programs
must take on the task of reducing that demand and
allocating the supply available. To reduce demand, a
contigency conservation plan has been drafted, but as
of this date it has not been submitted to Congress. 6
Reduce Petroleum Demand
Two kinds of fuel conservation programs are outlin-
ed. The mandatory program consists of those
measures which will be taken under penalty of legal
prosecution. Presently five measures are proposed.
These are: (1 ) restrictions on heating and cooling of
public, commercial, and industrial establishments,
(2) restrictions on available commuter parking
spaces, (3) elimination of weekend gasoline sales to
privately operated motor vehic les, (4) requirements
to increase industrial boiler efficiency, and (5) reduc-
tions in illuminated advertising and natural gas
lighting. Taken together these measures could save
between .3 and .5 mmb per day.
In addition to these mandatory programs, citizens
and business establishments will be requested to un-
dertake a number of voluntary activities aimed at
restraining demand. Suggested actions made
through the media will include thermostat ad-
justments, reduced electricity use, automobile
tuneups, and elimination of nonessential motor vehi-
cle use. The last embargo revealed a willingness on
the part of the American people to reduce demand ina
crisis. We can therefore expect some voluntary de-
mand restraint in the future, although probably less
than the last crisis situation due to the higher value
(price) petroleum now has in our society.
If the reduced demand is not sufficient to eliminate
the supply/demand shortfall, an allocation program
must be introduced. Particular quantities of fuels
must be targeted for specific consumers. Currently
two allocation programs are operational. The first
allocates crude oil among refineries, while the se-
cond takes the outputs from the refineries, —
gasoline, distillate fuel, residual oil, etc., —and dis-
tributes them by the type of end use to which they will
be put.
Petroleum Allocation
The crude oil program, aimed at refineries, is
designed to equalize the crude shortfall among the
primary producers of petroleum products with the
hope that by so doing regional inequities will be
reduced and relative market shares will be protected.
As currently set up, this program, (called the buy/sell
program) calculates a national fraction of base period
supply. A refinery is classified as buyer or seller
depending on how its supplies compare to the
national fraction. If it is above the national fraction,
the refinery will be forced to sell the excess to those
who fall below it.
In times of severe crisis or substantial reductions in
petroleum product imports, another program much
more complex than the buy/sell will be activated.
While still on the drawing board, the Refinery Yield
Program is designed to optimally use available
refinery capacity to produce a specific mix of
products. For instance, if an embargo were to occur
during an especially cold winter, concern for public
safety might require the sacrifice of some gasoline
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production in favor of producing a greater percentage
of middle distillate fuels for home heating. That is, for
each barrel of crude oil processed a much larger frac-
tion of distillate oil would be produced than is normal-
ly the case. By shifting the product mix in this way no
new supplies will be created. We simply trade disrup-
tion brought on by gasoline unavailability for the
health of those living in oil heated homes. Such a
program could use price or allocation as incentive for
the production shift. For instance, during the 1973
episode the government wanted to effect a shift away
from gasoline and toward production of middle dis-
tillates. The shift was accomplished by allowing a 2
cent per gallon price increase for heating fuels at the
same time reducing allowable gasoline prices by 1
cent per gallon. A shift could also be affected by
allowing the more flexible refineries or those with
historically higher yields of preferred products
proportionately larger crude oil supplies. This would
favor large refineries like those in Texas and
Louisiana with more internal flexibility over smaller
operations. A possible deliberate inequity in crude oil
allocations would have to be reversed by money or
refined product transfers among affected refineries.
Output from refineries is distributed by the Man-
datory Product Allocation Program. This program
assigns a priority classification to each end user and
associates with each classification a certain percen-
tage allocation based on available supplies. Six priori-
ty groups are defined. National defense and
agriculture, designated as priority one users, receive
1 00 percent of current requirements. Emergency ser-
vices and mass transportation systems, among
others of priority two, are allocated their current re-
quirements adjusted by an allocation fraction which
relates current supplies to those that were expected
given traditional demand. The next four priority
groups receive a decreasing fractional percentage of
their base period demand or current requirements.
Private motor vehicles are assigned the lowest priori-
ty for gasoline and no individual allocations are made
(the only legal stipulation being that a retailer must
not discriminate among purchasers). Table 2 gives a
list of some common petroleum users, and the per-
cent of supplies to which they are entitled from the
three major petroleum products. The table is not all
inclusive since some users receive different
allocations over the spectrum of petroleum products.
To insure a smooth operation of the product alloca-
tion program each state may reserve three to four per-
cent of available supplies. These are dispensed by
petition to customers of wholesalers and retailers
particularly hard hit by high priority demands.
The final allocation program designed specifically
for priority seven is gasoline coupon rationing. The
EPCA mandated that a gasoline coupon rationing
plan be developed and the plan is scheduled for sub-
mission to Congress some time next year. The ration-
Table 2
Petroleum Uses and Mandatory Allocations
Fuel Type
Motor Gasoline
Middle Distillates
Residual Fuel
Energy Uses
Agricultural Production
National Defense
Emergency Services
Mass Transportation
Industrial Use
Commercial Use
Governmental Use
Agricultural Production
National Defense
Space Heating of Hospitals
And Nursing Buildings
Emergency Services
Drug Manufacture
Industrial Space Heating
Commercial and Residential
Space Heating
Agricultural Production
National Defense
Electric Utilities
Industrial Use
Allocation
100% C.R.
100% C.R.
100% C.R. x A.F.
100% C.R. x A.F.
100% B.P. x A.F.
100% B.P. x A.F.
100% B.P. x A.F.
100% C.R.
100% C.R.
100% C.R.
100% C.R. x A.F
100% C.R. x A.F.
100% C.R. x A.F.
100% B.P. x A.F. or 88B.P
(Whichever is greater)
100% C.R.
100% C.R.
Equal percentage cutback
within specified groups
100% B.P.
Legend
C.R. Current Requirements
B.P. Base Period Demand
A.F. Allocation Fraction (Equal to supplies available
divided by projected demand after a certain priority
group have been allocated fuel.)
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ing program would allow a "white market", the above-
board selling of ration coupons, and would act to
alleviate long gasoline lines and inconvenience and
annoyance. However, the actual price of gasoline
would increase as coupons are bid up. The number of
coupons released would approximate projected gas-
oline production.
Are We Prepared?
To state that we are more prepared thanwe were in
1 973 would be saying little, since the events of 1 973
took us all by complete surprise. Since that time
energy conditions in the United States have drastical-
ly changed. Nevertheless, the detailed strategy plans
have been prepared and the larger projects like the
Strategic Reserve are moving forward. While it is not
possible to "arrange" a trial embargo to evaluate
these elaborate plans under fire, their existence and
continuing refinement should remove much of the
uncertainty, apprehension and fear associated with a
repeat of October 1973. Although we may still be
called upon to make considerable sacrifices we will
not be taken by surprise.
Of particular importance to North Carolina is the
fact that considerable care has been taken in these
plans to protect those of us on the east coast; that is,
to regionally distribute any shortfall related economic
hardship. Also, the Federal Energy Administration
has encouraged individual states to adopt contingen-
cy conservation and distribution plans of their own.
Because of our bitter experience during the last
embargo, the state of North Carolina is well along in
this effort. In October of this year the Emergency
Energy Program Subcommittee of the state's Energy
Policy Council published a draft form of a state con-
tigency plan. 7 This document, entitled Emergency
Energy Program, proposes a variety of conservation
measures, describes the procedures for ad-
ministering the State Set Aside, and details the
organizational structure which will supply the inter-
face required for the national programs to operate
effectively. The state's program is developed in such a
way as to function in the event the crisis is local in
effect or before a state of national emergency has
been declared.
The long list of conservation programs in the state's
plan includes restrictions on times of gasoline sales,
increased use of public transportation and car pools,
reduced shopping trips, and increased fuel efficiency
by specific suggestions on vehicle operation and
maintenance.
Efficient implementation of the State Set Aside
Program; well detailed in the Emergency Energy
Program will be especially important in helping
protect our elderly population, who because of loca-
tion and general conditions within the general dis-
tribution system, may have no other recourse in the
event of allocation imperfections. The State Set Aside
is a channel to quickly rectify spot changes.
With the proper preparation, resolve, and citizen
trust, both locally and nationally, we will be able to
economically fight back. The Arab nations are becom-
ing increasingly dependent upon oil revenues. The
Domestic fuels are given high priority rating
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next embargo will impact them to a much greater
degree and will put us in that much stronger a posi-
tion. As time goes on and the Strategic Reserve ap-
proaches its design volume, our position can only im-
prove, and as a direct consequence, the likelihood of
another embargo will diminish.
However, this is not to say that the national and
state strategies are without important implications
for North Carolinians or that a future embargo will re-
quire no more than a few modest changes in lifestyle.
Rather the very orientation of these programs will
make it a very hard time for those people and
regions heavily dependent on motor gasoline for
essential daily activities.
Implications and Comments
Of the three major uses for petroleum which most
concern our daily well being—electric power genera-
tion, home heating and transportation—North
Carolinians are relatively secure with two. Unlike the
Northeast, where air quality constraints compel the
use of low sulfur residuai fuel oil, electric power in
North Carolina is generated primarily from coal bur-
ning and nuclear facilities. For example, only 3% of
Duke Power's total generating capacity from fossil
fuel and hydroelectric plants is petroleum based. 8
This small percentage which is considerably less
upon inclusion of nuclear generation is almosttotally
due to a number of small peak load internal combus-
tion plants. Such peak load facilities are only ac-
tivated during the hot summer months, the least
vulnerable time of the year from the standpoint of a
petroleum embargo since demand for distillate fuels
for home heating is negligible. With this lowreliance
on petroleum-derived electricity we should expect no
brownouts, nor will the utilities serving the state be
forced to make large orders for emergency coal
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shipments. Business as usual should suffice.
The state, however, is quite reliant on petroleum for
home heating. A recent energy study in Orange
County, not a representative area but indicative of our
reliance on petroleum based home heating, es-
timated residential heating to be 12% of total
petroleum consumption. 9 Seasonal variations
probably double or triple that percentage during the
winter. A considerable reduction in distillate fuel
supply would create a sizable public health hazard. It
is to alleviate this threat to the public health that the
Mandatory Product Allocation Program places a floor
"The national and state plans fail to
address the physical need for moving
people to essential activities."
of 88 percent of base period use under residential dis-
tillate supplies. However this protection is not
without its cost. As already mentioned, during the last
embargo, distillate production was increased at the
expense of gasoline. If the public health is jeopardized
once again the same tradeoff will be made.
It is the resultant compounded reduction in gas-
oline supplies which poses the greatest threat to the
personal and economic well being of the citizens of
this state. North Carolina is basically a commuting
state. Low residential densities make efficient (cost
returning) mass transportation systems virtually im-
possible. Most larger cities have small bus systems
but even these have serious financial problems,
witness the Raleigh and Chapel Hill systems. Thus
our main worry in a future substantial petroleum
supply denial will be finding alternatives to private
automobile use, now the life blood of our economic
activity.
The national and state plans fail to address the
physical need for moving people to essential ac-
tivities. Whereas the focus of the national programs is
on governmental regulation of the energy market, it is
nevertheless entirely market oriented. It simply es-
tablishes new rules for market transactions. Fuel
allocation is done by coupon, priority level, or man-
dated conservation rather than by price. The in-
dividual actor or "purchaser" in this market is still re-
quired to fend for himself, to do the best he can for
himself under the circumstances. This is fine for
national level programs, but state and local activities
should go much further. However, the emergency
plan of the state echoes this same orientation. Fuel is
made less available by restricting sales or requiring
certain conservation practices, and emergency
allocations are made to special hardship cases, but
the fact that many people will have to get to certain
locations is ignored.
This focus on market regulation and reliance on in-
dividual action neglectsthe basic economicdefinition
of the short term. It is in the short term that we are
most restricted ontheactionswecantake, most com-
mitted to our present way of doing things. It is in the
short term that individual action will be the most un-
productive, especially in efficiently reducing gasoline
use patterns, which are currently so vital.
State and local government planners must go
beyond "encouragement" or "guidance" and
propose concrete measures for moving people to es-
sential activities during periods of substantially
reduced gasoline supplies. Such measures might in-
clude emergency use of the school bus fleets which
lie idle most of the day, a system for rewarding those
who form car pools, emergency car pool information
centers in town halls, radio stations, and industrial
firms, and shifting to abbreviated 3-4 day work
weeks, with extended work shifts. Particularly effec-
tive programs might be centered around large
governmental and industrial employers. For instance,
in order to encourage pooling, employers should be
required to observe strict time schedules for all non-
hourly employees. The luxury of flexible schedules is
contrary to energy efficient automobile transporta-
tion. When it is necessary to require overtime or an
extended work day, employees should be notified well
in advance and work structured around car pool
members who stay beyond quitting time to ac-
comodate one who is forced to work.
Such simple measures should be specified clearly
within any contigency program developed by state or
local authorities. The market is impersonal. It is easy
to say that we will all have to "conserve" more,
"tighten our belts", but severe reductions in gasoline
availability will strike particular individuals very hard,
especially a sudden event like an embargo. To them
personal security will be as important as national
security. We have now addressed the latter, it is time
to give some assurances of the former.
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